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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent (hereafter "Painter") respectfully
submits that Plaintiff-Appellant (hereafter "Smurthwaite")
has, pursuant to his brief, limited this appeal to one issue.
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court's
ruling that the parties did not enter into an "agistment
bailment agreement" is supported by the evidence presented
at trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court has set forth a concise statement of
findings of fact, which Painter hereby adopts as being supported by the evidence in this case.
Painter also adopts as substantially correct the statement
of facts set forth in Appellant's Brief, with the following
additions and modifications:
1.

Painter adopts as the primary statement of fact

governing this case, the following statement set forth in
Appellant's own brief on Page 8 under Point I of his Argument:
For purposes of this Appeal, Mr. Smurthwaite accepts,
as being based on substantial evidence, the District
Court's Finding of Fact (record at 129 and 132) that
Mr. Painter did not expressly agree to provide anything
to Mr. Smurthwaite other than a place for Mr. Smurthwaite
to pasture his horses.
2.

Smurthwaite did not expect Painter to do any feeding

or taking care of the horses as shown by the following responses from Smurthwaite on direct examination concerning
his interpretation of the parties' agreement:
1
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Q. Did you [Smurthwaite] make any representations
about looking after the horses or taking care of them
in any way?
A. No. There was no mention and I didn't expect
him [Painter] to do any feeding whatsoever... Transcript
Vol. II, P. 29, L. 23-25.
3.

Painter told Smurthwaite that he did not have time

to look after or be concerned with Smurthwaitefs horses.
Transcript Vol. II, P. 226-228.
4.

At all times Smurthwaite had complete access to

and and control over his own horses in connection with bringing
in additional horses or taking horses away from the subject
pasturage.

Smurthwaite regularly moved horses in and out

in connection with his breeding business, with no need of
Painter's consent or knowledge.

At the end of each month

until November, 1983, Smurthwaite would count the number
of horses on the pasturage in order to determine the amount
of the rent owed to Painter at $15.00 per head per month.
Transcript Vol. II, P. 33; also P. 85 & 88.
5.

From the beginning of the parties1 pasture rental

agreement Smurthwaite had regularly inspected, fed and looked
after his own horses; At least two to three times a week
from the fall of 1981 up until his last visit in December
of 1983.
6.

Transcript Vol. II, P. 37, 40, 44, 49.
At all times relevant hereto Painter had a full

time job as an electrical contractor, which kept him away
from home from early morning until dusk during work days;
2
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Smurthwaite was fully aware of this.

Transcript Vol. II,

P. 215-216; also P. 87.
7.

Painter disputes Paragraph 3 of Smurthwaite's State-

ment of facts to the extent that it implies Smurthwaite was
not aware in the winter of 1983 that Smurthwaite's horses
were on the "lower pasture11.

Smurthwaite visited his horses

in December of 1983, finding them on the lower pasture, which
Smurthwaite claims to be less desirable as compared to the
upper pasture.

Smurthwaite did not take any action to move

his horses onto the upper pasture at that time, or to request
Painter to do so. Smurthwaite made no comment to Painter
about the situation, and left, not to return until February
8, 1984 after his horses had starved to death.

Transcript

Vol. II, P. 52, 78-79, 93-95.
8.

At all times relevant hereto there were three methods

of access to the lower pasture containing Smurthwaitefs horses.
One road past Painter's house and farmyard, and the others
to the south, not visible from Painter's house or yard, the
most accessible being through property owned by the "Sewer
Company".
winter.
9.

The Sewer Company's road was kept plowed in the
Transcript Vol. II, P. 220.
Smurthwaite testified that Painter had said that

since Painter lived close to the pasturage Painter would
call Smurthwaite if Painter or his family happened to see
something about the horses that required attention; But according to Smurthwaite's own testimony there was no obligation
3
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or requirement under the parties1 agreement, that Painter
actually go out into the fields and inspect Smurthwaitefs
horses, or attend to them in any way.
10.

Tr. Vol. I, P. 76.

Smurthwaite was an experienced horseman and horse

breeder, and Smurthwaite knew that Painter was not. Transcript
Vol. I, P. 74.
11.

Smurthwaite knew that horses need extra care and

feed through the winter months and could starve to death
in two to four weeks with no feed.

Transcript Vol. II, P.

71-72
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant has limited the question on this appeal to
one issue:

Did an agistment bailment exist between the par-

ties, contrary to the ruling of the trial court?

If there

was no such bailment agreement between the parties then
Smurthwaite's appeal must fail, because absent a contractual
duty to care for Smurthwaitefs property, Painter had no other
legal duty to do so.
It is Painterfs position, as well as the court's, that
the agreement was for pasturage rental only, with no duty
on the part of Painter to care for, look after, or feed the
horses.

Furthermore, Smurthwaite agrees in his own brief

herein, that the agreement between the parties was one for
pasturage rental only.

Under the express terms of the agree-

ment, and as supported by the law cited hereinbelow, Painter
had no obligation to Smurthwaite other than to provide the
4
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use of the pasture.

Therefore, Painter cannot be liable

for the death of the horses resulting from Smurthwaitefs
neglect through the winter of 1983-1984.
ARGUMENT
I.
THERE WAS NO BAILMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES BECAUSE PAINTER DID NOT AGREE
TO CARE FOR SMURTHWAITEfS HORSES AND
ACCOUNT FOR THEM AFTER A SPECIFIED TERM
An "Agistment Bailment'1 is no more or less than a bailment
agreement involving livestock.

A bailment agreement is an

agreement whereby property is entrusted or delivered to one
party by another in trust for a specified purpose, with the
express or implied agreement that the property will be returned
or accounted for when the purpose is accomplished.
The most recent Utah case on agistment bailment is Baker
v. Hansen, 666 P 2d 315 (Utah, 1983).

The plaintiff rancher

sued the defendant cattle owner under an "agistment lien",
and the Court found an agistment bailment under the following
circumstances:

The defendant cattle owner entered into an

agreement with the plaintiff rancher whereby the plaintiff
"...would pasture and care for [defendant's] cows for a period
of one year in exchange for 60 percent of the calf crop delivered by the impregnated cows during that year, and reimbursement for the care and feeding of the remaining livestock". 666
P 2d at 316.

In finding an agistment bailment, and in deter-

mining the amount of the plaintiff's agistor's lien, the
court took into consideration the plaintiff's charges for
5
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the value of the pasture, the amount of hay fed to the animals,
the costs to plaintiff for hay, and the value of the labor
performed in caring for the herd.

The court also found plain-

tiff was responsible for failure to return or account for
some of the cattle.

The court stated that "... a contract

to care for animals for a specified term ... and an obligation
to return or account for the animals at the end of the term...11
is an agistment bailment.

666 P 2d at 320.

Painter and Smurthwait clearly did not have such an
agreement here.

They had simply a pasture rental agreement.

The courts have distinguished a mere pasture rental agreement
from an agistment bailment agreement as regards the duty
owed by the land owner to the livestock owner.

In the case

of Cox vs. Pithoud, 34 Cal. Rptr, 582 (1963), the defendant
agreed to place 10 of plaintiff!s calves on defendant's irrigated pasture and to keep, water and maintain the calves.
Defendant neglected the calves, which were in poor condition
when plaintiff reclaimed them.

Plaintiff initiated an action

against defendant for the negligent injury of the calves.
The court found that under the conditions of the contract,
the defendant M ... was not merely leasing pasture to plaintiff
but actually was contracting as a agister or depositary of
animals for hire11.

34 Cal. Rptr. at 583. [Emphasis added].

The court found that as an agister the defendant had a duty
to provide the livestock with suitable food and to exercise
reasonable care for the safety of the animals.
6 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Other courts which have considered the issue and found
the same requirements for the creation of an agistment bailment
agreement are as follows:
Erbacher vs. Wargel, 465 N.E. 2d 195 (Indiana 1984),
where the bailor boarded a horse with the bailee for $65.00
per month, which included feed and care; David vs. Lose,
218 N.E. 2d 443 (Ohio, 1966), where the bailor delivered
a Tennessee Walking Horse mare into the custody and control
of bailee for breeding purposes, paying a stud fee therefore;
White v. Sullivan, 219 N.W. 908 (Minnesota 1928), where the
bailor, under an agreement with the bailee, delivered a horse
into the sole custody and control of bailee to v/ork on bailee's
farm.
An agistment bailment, as clearly set forth pursuant
to the above stated law, is an agreement whereby the bailee
takes custody and control of bailor's animals and cares for
them for a specified term.

The agreement between the parties

to this case is just as clearly distinguishable.

Smurthwaite

had complete access and control over his horses; had the
obligation to feed and care for them himself; could bring
in and take out horses at will; and, as Smurthwaite expressly
states, Painter did not agree to provide anything other than
a place for Smurthwaite to pasture his horses.
The appellant would have this court believe that contrary
to the express agreement between the parties in this case,
the law does, or should, still place a duty on Painter to
7
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look after and care for Smurthwaitefs horses as though Painter
were the "reasonable owner11.

Appellant cites several cases

which he says supports this proposition.

A reading of those

cases, however, shows that they are either totally inapplicable
factually and legally, or they are in fact cases where an
express bailment contract was formed between the parties,
and thus clearly distinguishable from this case.

Those cases

are as follows:
1.

Bramlette v. Titus, 267 P 2d 620 (Nevada, 1954).

In this case plaintiffs and defendants entered into an agreement whereby plaintiffs would deliver cattle to defendants1
ranch where they would graze with defendants1 cattle and
be cared for by defendants.

Defendants would feed plaintiffs1

cattle additional feed if necessary, using defendants1 own
judgment, and charge plaintiffs for the additional feed;
2.

Marcus v. Eastern Agr. Ass'n Inc., 157 A 2d 3 (N.J.,

1959).

This is a New Jersey Workman's Compensation case;

3.

Frazier v. Kern, 566 P 2d 956 (Wash., 1977).

This

case does not involve injury to animals under a pasturage
or bailment agreement.

Here the plaintiffs were attemmpting

to enjoin forfeiture of a lease of grazing land from defenThe court found that plaintiffs1 agreement with a

dant.

third party was not a "sublease11 nor an "assignment11, but
an "agistment".
4.

There was no discussion of bailment issues;

Baker v. Hansen is discussed above.

This was clearly

an express bailment agreement whereby the land owner would
8 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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take the livestock owner's cattle into his custody and care
for and feed them for one year;
5.

Hughes v, Yardley, 428 P 2d 158 (Utah, 1967).

The

defendants agreed to take cattle owned by plaintiffs onto
defendants1 ranch and pasture them from May 1, 1964 to October
1, 1964.

The plaintiffs were to pay one-half of the market

value of the gain of the cattle during that period;
6.

Ward v. Newell, 315 S.E. 2d 721 (N.C., 1984).

The

plaintiff bought a mare from the defendant after which the
parties entered into an agreement whereby the

,f

... mare would

be left in the defendant's care and custody for a period
of 30 days".

This was later extended for an additional period

of time and the plaintiff paid a boarding fee.
7.

Vaughn v. Bixby, 142 P 100 (Cal., 1914).

The plain-

tiffs placed four horses into the "charge and control11 of
defendants.

The plaintiffs did not inspect the pasture upon

defendants1 promise that they would "look after them, and
put them where (there) is feed and water".
In none of the cases cited by Appellant is there really
an issue as to the existence of a bailment.

The existence

of a bailment was clear because in each of the cited cases
there was a taking into custody by the bailee and caring
for the animals, usually for a specified term.

In each of

the cited cases the parties expressly agreed to terms which
constituted a bailment and the bailee was aware of his duty
to care for the animals.
9
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CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court's
ruling that the parties did not enter into an agistment bailment agreement was proper and was based upon the evidence
in this case.

The court correctly ruled that such an agreement

"...requires in all cases that the person sought to be charged
has some contractual responsibility for the care of the livestock".

The absence of such an agreement was clearly supported

by the facts, and respondent respectfully requests that the
Judgment of the trial court be sustained.
DATED this

/Y

day of November, 1986.

TAYLOR pr.j CARR
Attorney/for DefendantRespondent
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